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One of the central projects of formal epistemology concerns the formula-
tion and justification of epistemic norms. The project has three stages: First,
the formal epistemologist produces a mathematical model of an agent’s epis-
temic states—call this the descriptive stage. Next, she formulates, in terms of
this model, putative norms that she claims govern these states—call this the
normative stage. Finally, she provides a justification for these norms—call this
the justificatory stage. It is one of the great virtues of formal epistemology that
the final justificatory stage can be made mathematically precise. The strategy
is this: the formal epistemologist states an epistemic norm that is taken to be
more general and fundamental than those given in the normative stage; this
norm is then formulated in terms of the mathematical model provided by the
descriptive stage; and the norms posited in the normative stage are derived
from this fundamental norm by means of a mathematical theorem.
1 Introducing epistemic utility theory
In this paper, I wish to give a survey of a branch of formal epistemology that I
will call epistemic utility theory. In epistemic utility theory, the descriptive and
normative stages are not novel. We follow Bayesianism and other theories of
partial beliefs in modelling an agent’s epistemic state at a given time t by a
belief function bt, which takes each proposition A about which the agent has
an opinion and returns a real number bt(A) such that 0 ≤ bt(A) ≤ 1. We take
bt(A) to measure the agent’s degree of belief in A at time t.
Throughout, we represent propositions as sets of possible worlds. We
denote by W the set of all possible worlds about which our agent has an
opinion, and we assume that W is finite. We let F be the algebra over W that
represents the set of all propositions about which our agent has an opinion.
We denote by B the set of possible belief functions on this algebra: that is,
B = {b : F → [0, 1]}. We denote by P the set of belief functions that satisfy
the axioms of finitely additive probability, and byN the set of belief functions
that do not satisfy those axioms. Thus, P and N partition B.
On the whole, the norms that we seek to justify in epistemic utility theory
are those endorsed by the Bayesian. For instance:
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Probabilism For any time t, it ought to be the case that bt ∈ P ; that
is, bt ought to be a finitely additive probability function on F .
Conditionalization If, between t and t′, the agent learns the propo-
sition E with certainty and nothing more, and if bt(E) > 0, then it
ought to be the case that
bt′(·) = bt(·|E) =d f . bt(· ∩ E)bt(E)
Thus, the novelty of epistemic utility lies in the justificatory stage. Before
I explain in what this novelty consists, let me review the traditional moves
made by Bayesians in the justificatory stage.
Bayesians tend to appeal to one of two putative fundamental norms:
Undutchbookable An agent ought not to have a belief function
that would lead her to consider as fair each of a series of bets that
would, if taken together, be sure to lose her money—such a series
of bets is known as a Dutch book.
Consistent preferences An agent ought not to have a belief func-
tion that gives rise to an inconsistent set of preferences when com-
bined with her utility function in the standard way.
From the first, by means of a mathematical result known as a Dutch book
theorem, Bayesians conclude that an agent ought to obey Probabilism ([16],
[2]). From slight amendments to the first, and again by means of Dutch book
theorems, they conclude that an agent ought to obey Conditionalization ([12])
together with a host of extensions to the Bayesian norms, such as Regular-
ity ([18]), Reflection Principle ([21]), and Jeffrey Conditionalization ([19]). From
the second putative fundamental norm, by means of a mathematical result
known as a representation theorem, Bayesians conclude that an agent ought to
obey Probabilism ([7], [17], [13]).
The literature is teeming with objections to these approaches to the justi-
ficatory stage, as well as with increasingly sophisticated versions of these ap-
proaches that hope to avoid these objections. However, one objection stands
out for its simplicity and power. According to this objection, the sort of jus-
tification just considered fails because it fails to identify what we really think
is irrational about someone whose degrees of belief violate the axioms of the
probability calculus, or who updates in the face of new evidence in some
way other than by conditionalizing. If Paul believes that Linda is both a bank
teller and a political activist more strongly than he believes that she is a bank
teller, we regard him as irrational. But this is not because his partial beliefs
will lead him to consider a Dutch book fair, or because the preferences to
which his beliefs will give rise when combined with his utility function will
be inconsistent. These latter facts hold, and they are presumably undesir-
able for Paul; but they are not relevant to the irrationality that we ascribe
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to him. Intuitively, what is irrational about his partial beliefs is something
purely epistemic; it is not even partly pragmatic. This is the first observation
that motivates epistemic utility theory.
The second observation that motivates epistemic utility theory is that
epistemic states can be treated as epistemic acts. That is, we can treat an
agent who is in a particular epistemic state as an agent who has performed a
particular sort of act, namely, the act of adopting that epistemic state. Putting
these two observations together gives epistemic utility theory. Since an epis-
temic state is treated as a kind of act, we can assess the rationality of being
in a particular epistemic state at a particular time using the apparatus of util-
ity theory, which we traditionally use to assess the rationality of a particular
sort of non-epistemic act. In utility theory, we appeal to an agent’s utility
function U, which takes an action A from the set A of possible actions that
the agent might perform, together with a possible world w ∈ W, and re-
turns a real number or −∞ or ∞, which we denote U(A, w), that measures
the degree to which the agent values the outcome of act A at world w. And
we state norms that govern which act she should choose to perform either
in terms only of her utility function, or in terms of both her utility and be-
lief functions. Typically, of course, the agent will be represented as valuing
the pragmatic, non-epistemic features of these possible outcomes, such as
the level of well-being it entails for her, and this will be reflected in the util-
ity function. However, if we are assessing the rationality of epistemic acts
in which a particular epistemic state is adopted, there is no reason why the
agent could not be represented as valuing the purely epistemic features of the
outcomes of these epistemic acts at different worlds. All of this would then
be reflected in an epistemic utility function EU, which would take a belief
function b ∈ B, together with a possible world w, and return a real number
or −∞ or ∞ that measures the degree to which the agent would value b at w.
With this in hand, we could then appeal to the same norms that govern which
non-epistemic act an agent should choose to perform to give the norms that
govern which epistemic states an agent should adopt. This is the strategy of
epistemic utility theory. In the rest of the paper, I review the results it has
yielded so far, and I suggest work that needs to be done in the future. First,
however, we must answer a possible objection to the general strategy.
It might be complained that epistemic states cannot be treated as epis-
temic acts, since they are not something over which we have control, unlike
acts: we cannot choose what to believe, but we can choose how to act. Of
course, both conjuncts of this objection have been denied: voluntarism denies
that we cannot choose our epistemic states; and scepticism about free will de-
nies that we can choose our acts. But we would not wish our epistemology
to depend on such controversial claims. Fortunately, we do not have to. De-
cision theory has two purposes: prior to a decision over which the agent has
control, it can be used to help her to decide rationally what to do—call this
the prescriptive use; and after an act has been performed, it can be used to de-
termine whether that act was rational—call this the evaluative use. When we
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appeal to decision theory in epistemic utility theory, we wish to appeal only
to its evaluative use, and that is available even when the act under consider-
ation was not within the control of the agent.
2 Probabilism, propriety, and act-type dominance
We begin with a collection of arguments for Probabilism that share a similar
structure: each appeals to a version of the decision-theoretic norm Dominance;
and each assumes amongst its premises a permissive version of Probabilism,
the mandatory version of which they seek to establish. The arguments are
due to Joyce ([9]) and Predd, et al. ([15]), though Predd, et al. do not explicitly
endorse this normative reading of their results.
2.1 The arguments
To state the results, we require some terminology.
Definition 2.1 (Weak and strong dominance) Suppose A, A′ ∈ A; and sup-
pose that U is a utility function. Then
• A′ weakly dominates A relative to U if
(i) U(A′, w) ≥ U(A, w) for all w ∈W; and
(ii) U(A′, w) > U(A, w) for some w ∈W.
• A′ strongly dominates A relative to U if
(i) U(A′, w) > U(A, w) for all w ∈W.
Definition 2.2 (Weak and strong act-type dominance) Now suppose thatA1,A2 ⊆
A together partition A. Then
• A1 weakly act-type dominates A2 relative to U if
(i) Every act in A2 is weakly dominated by an act in A1 relative to U; and
(ii) No act in A1 is weakly dominated by any other act relative to U.
• A1 strongly act-type dominates A2 relative to U if
(i) Every act in A2 is strongly dominated by an act in A1 relative to U; and
(ii) No act in A1 is weakly dominated by any other act relative to U.
With this terminology in hand, we can state two act-type versions of Dom-
inance:
Weak Act-Type Dominance If A1 weakly act-type dominates A2
relative to U, then the agent ought to perform an agent in A1.
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Strong Act-Type Dominance If A1 strongly act-type dominates A2
relative to U, then the agent ought to perform an agent in A1.
The various arguments we are considering in this section attempt to justify
Probabilism by appealing to Weak or Strong Act-Type Dominance. They begin
by dividing an agent’s possible epistemic acts—that is, the belief functions
she might adopt at a particular time—into those that satisfy Probabilism and
those that do not. They then present a list of features that they claim an
epistemic utility function ought to boast. And finally they prove that, for any
epistemic utility function EU that has these features, the set P of epistemic
acts that satisfy Probabilism either weakly or strongly act-type dominates the
set N of epistemic acts that violate it relative to EU. They conclude that
Probabilism is correct.
Before I present the mathematical theorems upon which these arguments
rely, I survey the features that have been proposed as necessary for a legiti-
mate epistemic utility function. The first three putative necessary conditions
on an epistemic utility function EU each say that EU should not rule out as
irrational prior to any evidence those belief functions that satisfy Probabil-
ism. In this sense, they state weak permissive versions of Probabilism: where
Probabilism states that having a probabilistic belief function is mandatory, the
following three conditions on EU demand that the epistemic utility function
should make it the case that such belief functions are at least permitted prior
to any evidence.
Definition 2.3 (Propriety) An epistemic utility function EU is proper if, for all
p ∈ P and b ∈ B, if b 6= p, then, prior to any evidence, p expects itself to have at
least as great epistemic utility relative to EU as it expects b to have.
That is, for all p ∈ P and b ∈ B, if b 6= p, then
ExpWp (p) = ∑
w∈W
p(w)EU(p, w) ≥ ∑
w∈W
p(w)EU(b, w) = ExpWp (b)
where we abuse notation and write p(w) for p({w}).
Definition 2.4 (Strict Propriety) An epistemic utility function EU is strictly proper
if, for all p ∈ P and b ∈ B, if b 6= p, then, prior to any evidence, p expects itself to
have greater epistemic utility relative to EU than it expects b to have.
That is, for all p ∈ P and b ∈ B, if b 6= p, then
ExpWp (p) = ∑
w∈W
p(w)EU(p, w) > ∑
w∈W
p(w)EU(b, w) = ExpWp (b)
Definition 2.5 (Coherent Admissibility) An epistemic utility function EU is co-
herent admissible if, for all p ∈ P and b ∈ B, if b 6= p, then b does not weakly
dominate p relative to EU.
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We will have much to say about these three properties of EU in section 2.2
below. Before that, however, we turn to the two further features that are
demanded of EU by the arguments we are considering in this section.
Definition 2.6 (Truth-Directedness) An epistemic utility function EU is truth-
directed if, for all belief functions b, b′ ∈ B, and all worlds w ∈W, if
(i) |b(A)− χA(w)| ≤ |b′(A)− χA(w)| for all propositions A ∈ F and
(ii) |b(A)− χA(w)| < |b′(A)− χA(w)| for some proposition A ∈ F
then
EU(b′, w) < EU(b, w)
where χA : W → {0, 1} is the characteristic function of A: that is, χA(w) = 1, if
w ∈ A; χA(w) = 0, if w 6∈ A.
Thus, an epistemic utility function is truth-directed if, whenever b is always
at least as close to the truth as b′ and sometimes closer, the epistemic utility
of b is greater than the epistemic utility of b′.
Definition 2.7 (Additivity) An epistemic utility function EU is additive if, for
each A ∈ F , there is uA : [0, 1]× {0, 1} → [0,∞] such that
EU(b, w) = ∑
A∈F
uA(b(A),χA(w))
Thus, an epistemic utility function is additive if the epistemic utility of b at w
is obtained by taking, for each proposition A ∈ F , a measure uA of the ‘local’
epistemic utility of the degree of belief b(A) at w, and then summing together
all of these ‘local’ epistemic utilities.
We are now in a position to state the three mathematical theorems that are
taken to justify Probabilism on the basis of the versions of Dominance stated
above.
Theorem 2.8 (Predd, et al.) Suppose
(i) EU is proper;
(ii) EU is additive;
(iii) For all A ∈ F , uA(x, 0) and uA(x, 1) are continuous on [0, 1].
Then P weakly act-type dominates N relative to EU.
Theorem 2.9 (Predd, et al.) Suppose
(i) EU is strictly proper;
(ii) EU is additive.
(iii) For all A ∈ F , uA(x, 0) and uA(x, 1) are continuous on [0, 1].
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Then P strongly act-type dominates N relative to EU.
Theorem 2.10 (Joyce) Suppose
(i) EU is truth-directed;
(ii) EU is coherent admissible;
(iii) For b ∈ B and w ∈W, EU(b, w) is finite;
(iv) For all w ∈W, EU(b, w) is continuous on B.
Then P strongly act-type dominates N relative to EU.
2.2 Propriety, strict propriety, and coherent admissibility
I turn now to consider an objection to these arguments. It concerns the claims
that propriety, strict propriety, or coherent admissibility is a necessary feature
of a legitimate epistemic utility function. The literature contains two sorts of
argument for these claims. I follow Gibbard ([4]) in calling the first sort the
arguments from immodesty; and I follow Oddie ([14]) in calling the second sort
the arguments from conservativism.
The objection I wish to raise is not directed against the claims that an
epistemic utility function must be proper, or strictly proper, or coherent ad-
missible. Instead, I object that these claims cannot form the premise of an ar-
gument that seeks to delimit the set of legitimate epistemic utility functions;
rather, if they are true at all, they must be corollaries of such an argument.
2.2.1 The arguments from immodesty
First, some terminology:
Definition 2.11 (Grades of modesty) Suppose b is a belief function. Then
• b is extremely modest if there is a belief function b′ such that b expects b′ to have
greater expected epistemic utility than b expects itself to have.
• b is moderately modest if there is a belief function b′ such that b expects b′ to
have at least as great expected epistemic utility as b expects itself to have.
• b is quite modest if there is a belief function b′ that weakly dominates b.
Then the argument from immodesty in favour of demanding propriety runs
as follows ([4], [9]):
Argument from Weak Immodesty to Propriety
(1) Permissive Probabilism Prior to any evidence, each probabilis-
tic belief function is rationally permitted.
(2) Weak Immodesty No extremely modest belief function is ra-
tionally permitted at any time.
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(3) Therefore, EU must be proper.
The argument is valid, so we consider the premises. The assumption of Per-
missive Probabilism is shared by all the arguments we will consider, so we
postpone its discussion until later (section 2.2.3). Thus, let us consider Weak
Immodesty. As Joyce notes, this premise is a probabilistic version of the norm
for full beliefs known as Moore’s paradox, which says that it is irrational for
someone to believe ‘A, but I do not believe A’. The problem with such a
belief is that it undermines itself. Similarly, a belief function that expects a
different belief function to be better from a purely epistemic point of view
than it expects itself to be undermines itself. Therefore, it is never rationally
permitted. This seems reasonable.
Of course, this version of the argument from immodesty will only de-
liver the demand of propriety required for this first argument of Predd, et
al. It will not support the demand of strict propriety required by their sec-
ond argument, nor Joyce’s demand of coherent admissibility. To obtain the
conclusion that EU must be strictly proper, we must replace Weak Immodesty
by
(2’) Strong Immodesty 1 No moderately modest belief function is rationally
permitted at any time.
Unfortunately, this is considerably less plausible than Weak Immodesty. No
analogue of Moore’s paradox threatens here because a moderately modest
belief function does not undermine itself; rather, it merely expects another
belief function to be as good, and it is far from clear that this is an epistemic
defect.
A similar problem arises if we wish to obtain the conclusion that EU must
be coherent admissible. To obtain this conclusion, we must replace Weak
Immodesty by
(2”) Strong Immodesty 2 No quite modest belief function is rationally per-
mitted at any time.
This may seem more plausible than Strong Immodesty. Surely any weakly
dominated belief function undermines itself in exactly the way that a prob-
abilistic version of Moore’s paradox rules out. But this is not necessarily
so. Suppose that b is a quite modest belief function that is weakly domi-
nated by b′; and suppose further that, for all those worlds w ∈ W such that
EU(b′, w) > EU(b, w), we have that b(w) = 0. Then b will expect b′ to have
the same epistemic utility that it expects itself to have. Moreover, it seems
that b does not undermine itself in this case. After all, in all the worlds that
it considers possible (that is, those for which b(w) > 0) it has no less epis-
temic utility than b′. So it does not undermine itself. This is just the familiar
point that an act that weakly dominates all other acts is not necessarily the
only rational act to choose, since the agent’s belief function might rule out as
impossible those worlds at which the domination is strict.
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2.2.2 The argument from conservatism
Let us see whether the argument from conservatism fares any better. It runs
as follows:
Argument from Conservatism
(1) Permissive Probabilism Prior to any evidence, each probabilis-
tic belief function is rationally permitted.
(2) Conservatism If b is rationally permitted, then it is not rational
to abandon b in favour of an alternative belief function b′ in the
absence of any new evidence.
(3) Maximize Expected Utility It is rationally permitted to perform
an act if, and only if, that act maximizes expected utility.
(4) Maximal Epistemic Expected Utility Exists For any belief func-
tion b, there is a belief function b′ for which ExpWb (·) is maxi-
mal.
(5) Therefore, EU must be strictly proper, and thus proper and
coherent admissible.
The argument is valid. But what of Conservatism? I suspect that this principle
seems plausible only when we restrict our attention to the familiar example
of an agent who arbitrarily abandons her original epistemic state in favour
of another without evidence: for instance, the religious convert who, without
any new evidence, suddenly shifts from a low to a high degree of belief in the
existence of God. However, when we broaden our view and consider the less
familiar example of an agent who, in the absence of new evidence, shifts from
one epistemic state to another because the original one expects the other to be
just as good, the intuitive force of Conservatism disappears. Of such an agent,
the proponent of Conservatism would have to say that her original epistemic
state was not rationally permitted, and this seems too quick.
2.2.3 Permissive probabilism
Finally, we turn to the assumption of Permissive Probabilism. All existing ar-
guments in favour of this claim proceed along similar lines. They identify a
particular feature X of belief functions; they argue that X is a desirable feature
for a belief function to have; they show that each probabilistic belief function
has feature X; and they conclude that it is rationally permitted to have any
probabilistic belief function prior to accumulating evidence. For instance, the
desirable feature X might be the feature had by a belief function just in case
there is a world in which the objective chances, or the long-run relative fre-
quencies, match the degrees of belief assigned by the belief function (§8, [9]).
However, if Permissive Probabilism is established in this way, the argu-
ments from immodesty and conservatism become invalid because they equiv-
ocate on the notion of rational permission that they employ. Consider, for in-
stance, the argument from weak immodesty to propriety. Suppose that its
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first premise relies on the sort of argument I have just outlined. Then that
premise should read:
(1’) Permissive ProbabilismX Prior to any evidence, each probabilistic belief
function is rationally permitted by an epistemic utility function that values
only X.
But, in that case, the argument is invalid. Its premises only entail that an
epistemic utility function that values only X must be proper. But the conclu-
sion is that any legitimate epistemic utility function must be proper. That is
what is required in order to mobilize the arguments for Probabilism by Joyce
and Predd, et al. But, absent further argument, we have no reason to think
that only epistemic utility functions that value only X are legitimate. Thus, it
seems that these arguments fail.
Further scepticism about propriety, strict propriety, and coherent admis-
sibility comes from appreciating just how strong Permissive Probabilism really
is. It amounts to an extreme form of subjectivism, for it states that, at the begin-
ning of an agent’s epistemic life, prior to the accumulation of any evidence,
any probabilistic belief function is rationally permitted. But many philoso-
phers have wished to deny that. For instance, those who favour Regularity
deny that a belief function for which b(A) = 0 for some A 6= ∅ is rational
at any time in an agent’s epistemic life. Of course, this contradicts Condition-
alization, but the tension is removed if the demand is made only for the first
point in an agent’s epistemic life, and this would be enough to refute Permis-
sive Probabilism if it were correct. Similarly, the objectivist Bayesians claim that
there is only one probabilistic belief function that is rationally permitted prior
to any evidence ([6], [22]). Thus, it seems again that, if Permissive Probabilism
is true, then it should be a corollary of an argument from epistemic utility,
not a premise in that argument. To include it as a premise begs too many of
the questions that we wish epistemic utility theory to answer.
3 Conditionalization, strict propriety, and maximizing
expected epistemic utility
The arguments considered in the previous section sought to establish Prob-
abilism by appealing to epistemic utility functions that do not rule out any
probabilistic belief functions as irrational. In this section, we consider an ar-
gument due to Greaves and Wallace that seeks to establish Conditionalization
by appealing to epistemic utility functions that do not rule just one proba-
bilistic belief function as irrational ([5]). While the arguments of the previous
section appealed to act-type versions of Dominance, this argument appeals to
Maximize Expected Utility. Throughout, we assume that Probabilism has been
established.
At time t, an agent has a belief function bt such that bt(E) > 0. Between t
and t′ she learns the proposition E (and nothing stronger) with certainty. She
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is thus faced with a range of epistemic acts from which she must choose: she
must choose which belief function to adopt. The natural norm that governs
this choice is the following version of Maximize Expected Utility:
Maximize Expected Utility In Light Of E If, between t and t′, an
agent obtains evidence that restricts the set of epistemically pos-
sible worlds to E ∈ F , then she ought to adopt a belief function
bt′ at time t such that, for all b,
ExpEbt(bt′) = ∑
w∈E
bt(w)EU(bt′ , w) > ∑
w∈E
bt(w)EU(b, w) = ExpEbt(b)
Note that the sum ranges only over the set of worlds that are epistemically
possible for the agent at t′. And the weightings are provided by the original
belief function bt.
Suppose now that we demand that our epistemic utility function satisfy
the following local version of strict propriety:
Definition 3.1 (Local strict propriety for bt(·|E)) An epistemic utility function
EU is locally strictly proper for bt(·|E) if, for all b 6= bt(·|E),
ExpWbt(·|E)(bt(·|E)) = ∑
w∈W
bt(w|E)EU(bt(·|E), w) > ∑
w∈W
bt(w|E)EU(b, w) = ExpWbt(·|E)(b)
Then the following theorem shows that Conditionalization follows:
Theorem 3.2 (Greaves and Wallace) Suppose EU is locally strictly proper for
bt(·|E). Then, for all b 6= bt(·|E),
ExpEbt(bt(·|E)) = ∑
w∈E
bt(w)EU(bt(·|E), w) > ∑
w∈E
bt(w)EU(b, w) = ExpEbt(b)
Thus, if EU is locally strictly proper for bt(·|E), then one ought to update
by conditionalization. Unfortunately, of course, the demand of local strict
propriety for bt(·|E) is vulnerable to the same objections as the global version
considered in the previous section. Arguments to establish it will make use
of a similarly localized version of Permissive Probabilism, as well as Strong
Immodesty 1. And we have seen the fate of these already.
4 The virtue of accuracy
In this final section, I consider two arguments in epistemic utility theory that
do not appeal to a permissive version of Probabilism. The first is due to Joyce
([8]); the second to Leitgeb and Pettigrew ([10], [11]).
Both arguments follow the same strategy. They begin with the claim that
the ultimate epistemic virtue is accuracy or closeness to the truth value. They
then attempt to characterize the epistemic utility functions that measure ac-
curacy. Finally, they employ decision-theoretic norms of the sort we have met
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above to derive certain epistemic norms using these epistemic utility func-
tions.
Joyce’s characterization of the accuracy-measuring utility functions al-
lows him to show that, for every non-probabilistic belief function b, there is
a probabilistic belief function p that strongly dominates it. That is, he proves
the first half of what is required to show that the set P of probabilistic belief
functions strongly act-type dominates the set N of non-probabilistic belief
functions. However, he does not prove the second half, which requires that
there is no probabilistic belief function p that is even weakly dominated by
another belief function. Thus, as Joyce admits, his argument fails (264, [9]).
Leitgeb and Pettigrew’s conditions on a measure of accuracy narrow down
the legitimate epistemic utility functions to a unique (up to positive linear
transformation) function, called the global quadratic accuracy measure:
QG(b, w′) = 1− ∑
w∈W
|b(w)− χ{w′}(w)|2
Unfortunately, QG does not discriminate between belief functions that agree
on degrees of belief they assign to individual worlds, but disagree on the de-
grees of belief they assign to more general propositions. Thus, in particular, it
cannot be used to establish that belief functions ought to be finitely additive,
as Probabilism demands. To rectify this shortcoming, Leitgeb and Pettigrew
also present arguments in favour of a particular local epistemic utility function:
whereas a (global) epistemic utility function measures the epistemic utility of
a whole belief function at a world, a local epistemic utility function measures
the epistemic utility of a particular degree of belief in a particular proposi-
tion at a world. In particular, they argue that the only local epistemic utility
function (up to positive linear transformation) that measures the accuracy of
degree of belief x in proposition A at world w is the local quadratic accuracy
measure:
QL(x, A, w) = 1− |x− χA(w)|2
They use this to establish Probabilism. They assume the following norm:
Weak Local Immodesty about Accuracy Suppose b is a belief func-
tion. And suppose there exists a proposition A and a possible
degree of belief r such that b expects the accuracy of degree of be-
lief r in A to be greater than it expects the accuracy of degree of
belief b(A) in A to be. Then b is irrational.
And they prove the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1 (Leitgeb and Pettigrew) Suppose E ∈ F . Then the following two
propositions are equivalent:
(i) b is a probability function and b(E) = 0.
(ii) b is a belief function such that b(w) = 0 for all w ∈ E and, for all A ∈ F ,
∑
w∈E
b(w)QL(x, A, w)
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is maximal for x = b(A).
Having done that, they are able to use QG to establish their other conclusions.
They establish Conditionalization using an argument similar to that used by
Greaves and Wallace. And they show that there are situations in which it
is irrational by the lights of QG to update using Richard Jeffrey’s generaliza-
tion of Conditionalization, known as Jeffrey Conditionalization. They propose an
alternative updating norm, which they establish by showing that it follows
from the relevant version of Maximize Expected Utility and the characteriza-
tion of QG.
By their own admission, the central problem with Leitgeb and Pettigrew’s
account is that it relies on certain geometric assumptions that seem stronger
than is warranted by purely epistemic considerations. It would be preferable
to excise these assumptions, yet retain the conclusions.
5 Conclusion
In sum, epistemic utility theory has so far furnished us with a number of ar-
guments for some of the central norms governing partial beliefs. Of course,
some are stronger than others, and it seems that none is yet decisive; each
relies on a premise that we might reasonably question. To conclude, I present
questions that need to be answered to improve these arguments, and to ex-
tend them to further norms that have not yet been considered.
• Is it legitimate to employ the notion of expected utility when the belief func-
tion by the lights of which the expected utility is calculated is not a proba-
bility function? (589, [8])
• To what extent do Leitgeb and Pettigrew’s results rely on the particular
geometrical assumptions they make?
• Can Joyce’s geometrical characterization of accuracy-measuring epistemic
utility functions be improved to allow a proof that, for all such functions
EU, the probabilistic belief functions strongly act-type dominate the non-
probabilistic belief functions relative to EU?
• Can we exploit the theorems considered in section 2.2 without assuming
propriety, strict propriety, or coherent admissibility by instead demanding
that our epistemic utility function have certain properties that together en-
tail these features?
• What light does epistemic utility theory shed on the more controversial
questions about partial beliefs? For instance, Elga’s Sleeping Beauty prob-
lem [3], van Fraassen’s Judy Benjamin problem [20], the Doomsday Argu-
ment and the Anthropic Principle [1], and van Fraassen’s Reflection Prin-
ciple [21].
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